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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is two-fold. Firstly, we present a methodology to measure the novel concept 
of elite quality (EQ), that is, country’s elites’ propensity– on aggregate – to create value, rather 
than rent seek. A four-level architecture allows for both an overall quantification of a country’s 
EQ, as well as an in-depth analysis of specific political economy dimensions, such as elite power. 
Secondly, the Elite Quality Index (EQx) is brought to life using data on 72 indicators for 32 
countries. Our index negatively correlates with inequality measures, which suggests that more 
powerful elites less inclined to run value creation business models will exacerbate inequality. A 
variety of robustness tests suggest that the EQx scores and ranking are robust to ceteris paribus 
changes in key modelling assumptions. Thus, the EQx offers a reliable framework and new tool to 
analyze the political economy of countries. 
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“…in this world, with great power there must also come -- great responsibility!” 
(Stan Lee’s Spider-Man (Amazing Fantasy #15), 1962) 
 
1 Introduction 
What is the role of elites in a country’s economic and human development? Are powerful elites 
beneficial or harmful to their countries’ institutional and economic performance? Can we measure 
when they are “good” or “bad” for their country? The recent surge in populistic movements all 
over the world renders such questions very topical. In this paper, we will try to sketch a structured 
data-driven answer to these questions, which will allow us to rank the different countries’ elites 
from the highest quality to the lowest. The aim is not judgmental, but hopefully useful to highlight, 
for each country, where improvement is possible and needed in order to facilitate its growth and 
development process. 
These issues have been approached by the literature from various angles. Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2012) distinguish between inclusive institutions - shaped by elites interested in their 
country’s productivity growth driven by investment and innovation - and “extractive” institutions, 
created by elites interested in extracting resources and exploiting the rest of society. Such 
institutions persist and are governed by political dynamics such as regulatory capture (Stigler 1971; 
Laffont and Tirole 1991). More recently, Acemoglu and Robinson (2016, 2019a) highlighted the 
crucial role of the never-ending tension (or “Red Queen effect”) between an increasing state 
capacity and a compensating civil society mobilization. In Western democracies, such a balance 
guarantees that government bureaucratic elites have the power to provide frameworks and 
incentives for value creation, enforce laws and solve conflicts, while society has the power to 
mobilize against abuse, extractive business models and exploitation. Like in an optimal growth 
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model’s saddle path, the relative strength of these two forces should follow a fine balance in order 
for the country not to diverge to too a strong bureaucratic elite (like China’s “despotic Leviathan”), 
nor to too week institutions with fragmented power distribution (like African countries’ “the cage 
of norms”). 
Highlighting yet another angle, Diamond (1997) promotes the importance of variation in 
geography, climate and biodiversity to account for differences between continents in early human 
history. Geographic considerations have also led to an extensive literature on the implications of 
natural resources and the “resource curse” for economic development (Humphreys, Sachs and 
Stiglitz 2007). Yet another strand of literature views history as the main determinant of the 
diverging patterns of economic development across the world (North 1981). History is argued to 
matter via several channels, for instance, via historically determined institutions. In their seminal 
paper, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) investigate the role of colonial origins for current 
institutions, in particular democracy and property rights. Another strand of literature focuses on 
the history of culture (see for instance Cozzi (1998) and Tabellini (2008) as well as the literature 
on social capital (Bourdieu 1986; Putnam 1994)). A link between history, development and 
religion was first proposed by Weber (1905). He argued for Protestantism, in contrast to 
Catholicism, to be an important factor in the early stages of European capitalism because it was 
characterized by a work ethic that encouraged hard work and the accumulation of wealth. 
Undeniably, the above discussed factors are crucial to understanding the great differences 
in living standards that exist across the world by determining the general setting a society operates 
in. However, this tends to ignore one of the driving forces behind change – elites – and releases 
them from their agency and responsibility for their nation’s human and economic development. 
Within a given setting, it is those with power and coordination capacity that determine how 
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resources are allocated, be it human, natural, financial or knowledge-based resources. Hence, in 
this study, we focus on leaders and decision-makers possessing the strongest coordination capacity 
over a society’s key resources – elites. How they act and what kind of business models they choose, 
determines social and economic outcomes. 
Parry (2005, introduction) refers to elites as “persons who attain the leading positions in a 
range of activities that have a major bearing on societies”. Accordingly, elites are the leading 
figures in sectors as diverse as, for instance, the political sector, the military, the bureaucratic 
apparatus, business, unions, or the media. According to Parry (2005, 15) the study of elites as part 
of political science dates back to Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) and Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941). 
Mosca, for instance, defined elites as “the class that rules… always less numerous, performs all 
political function, monopolises power and enjoys the advantages that  power brings” (quotation in 
Parry 2005, 33). 
How do elites utilize their coordination capacity? We argue that elites, as a network of 
powerful individuals, operate business models that generate wealth and allow its accumulation 
along with power. Furthermore, we claim that these individual business models can be located on 
a continuum that ranges from value creation to value extraction (Casas, 2020 forthcoming). While 
the former describes business models that, figuratively speaking, grow the elite’s slice of the pie 
by growing the entire pie, the latter describes business models that grow an elite’s slice of the pie 
by increasing its share. The term adopted for elites that engage in value creation business models 
is ‘high quality elites’, while elites that engage in value extraction business models are coined ‘low 
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quality elites’0F0F1. High quality elites give more to society than they take, while low quality elites 
take more from society than they give. We postulate that the aggregate of elites’ individual 
business models determines a country’s aggregate level of value creation. Quite importantly, we 
theoretically allow relatively unchecked powerful elites to behave in the interest of society even 
far away from Acemoglu and Robinson (2019a) “narrow corridor”. Such elite behavior is clearly 
commendable, because elites scoring high in terms of power could also do the opposite and 
leverage their capability to just extract resources. Hence, we will label such elites “high quality 
elites”. The most striking example of such benevolent attitude, as we will show, is certainly 
Singapore. Of course, by only focusing on elite observed behavior, we cannot predict whether such 
elites could later move to rent-seeking behavior, which is instead prevented on Acemoglu and 
Robinson’s “narrow corridor”. 
How can we measure elite quality? And what is the state of elite quality across countries? 
This paper aims to address these two questions. First, we propose a methodology to measure elite 
quality, that is, the ability of business models of a country’s elite – on aggregate – to create value, 
rather than rent seek. This is done by means of a composite index called “Elite Quality Index” 
(also index or EQx), where the underlying indicators provide quantitative evidence of different 
degrees of value creation and their opposite, value extraction. We present a host of robustness tests 
that suggest that the proposed index and the resulting scores and ranking are robust to a range of 
alternative specifications. Furthermore, our multi-layered index architecture allows for an in-depth 
analysis regarding specific aspects of elite quality at four different levels (sub-index, index area, 
 
1
 Welzel (2002, 319) employs a more specific concept of elite quality, claiming that the quality of elites is 
characterized by the extent of corruption and female representation. We will also incorporate these elements and 
generalize them. 
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pillar and indicator level). Thus, the EQx represents a new tool that can serve to analyze and 
compare the political economy of countries by shedding light on the aggregate quality of national 
elites. 
Second, we apply the proposed methodology to a set of 32 countries using data on 72 
indicators. The EQx reveals substantial differences in the state of elite quality across the considered 
countries. Singapore ranks first, with a considerable lead. Selected members of the European 
Union vary significantly in their performance, with EU countries spread between the 3rd (Germany) 
and 18th (Spain) rank. The United States comes in 5th. China comes in 12th and thus outperforms 
several European countries as well as the other BRICS countries Russia, India, Brazil and South 
Africa, which rank (in that order) between 23rd and 30th. We demonstrate the analytical and applied 
usefulness of the EQx as a toolset in economics by (1) presenting country portraits for the United 
States and Germany, (2) investigating its relation to inequality measures, and (3) comparing the 
EQx to existing measures of general economic and human development. 
The methodology laid out in this paper represents the starting point for the development of 
a longitudinal study with annual results and their qualitative interpretation. Further results and 
analysis for the 32 countries considered in the present study are offered in the Elite Quality Report 
2020 (forthcoming, 2020). It precedes the release of the EQx2021 Report that plans to rank over 
120 countries. Hence, another aim of the present study is to elicit a discussion and solicit inputs to 
improve the EQx methodology, the theoretical grounding and employed datasets. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical 
framework the EQx is based on. Section 3 details the methodology the index employs. Section 4 
presents key results and illustrates the explanatory power of the EQx. Section 5 scrutinizes the 
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index’ sensitivity to its underlying assumptions via a range of robustness tests. Finally, section 6 
concludes. 
 
2 Theoretical framework 
We work on the assumption that all elite business models can be located on a spectrum that ranges 
from value creation to value extraction. In parallel to Acemoglu and Robinson (2019b, 16), the 
term value ‘extraction’ is chosen to highlight the distributional effects of elites’ business models. 
It builds upon the seminal work of Tullock (1967) who introduced the notion of ‘rent seeking’ to 
show that the welfare costs of monopolies and tariffs are actually higher than the static deadweight 
loss they imply. Using Tullock’s (1967) terminology, value extraction business models are 
designed to create and capture rents. 
A similar dichotomy to value creating and extracting business models is implied by the 
concept of inclusive and extractive institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Inclusive 
institutions allow all individuals to participate in and benefit from economic activities “on a level 
playing field” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, 144), while extractive institutions imply that vast 
parts of a society are barred from participation while elites extract resources and opportunities. 
Importantly, this concept focuses on the classification of government structures. Our concept is 
different in that it shifts the focus on elite business model choices, within a given institutional, 
cultural and geographical setting. 
However, institutions and elites are closely related, as a country’s institutions regulate, 
incentivize and frame the actions and operations of the elite. On the other hand, following Casas 
(2020, forthcoming), we argue for directionality with elites influencing and shaping a country’s 
institutions. For instance, elites might exert pressure in the political realm to adjust institutions 
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according to their preferred business model. Low quality elites might promote monopolies or tax 
privileges that benefit them. High quality elites aiming at value creation might strengthen the 
public health and education system to develop human capital or promote the protection of property 
rights providing incentives for innovation, because these are resources consistent and required with 
value creation business models. 
 
Table 1. Structure of the elite quality index 
Index Sub-index Index area Pillar 
EQx 
I Power 
i. Political Power 
i.1 State Capture 
i.2 Regulatory Capture 
i.3 Human Capture 
ii. Economic Power 
ii.4 Industry Dominance 
ii.5 Firm Dominance 
ii.6 Creative Destruction 
II Value 
iii. Political Value 
iii.7 Giving Income 
iii.8 Taking Income 
iii.9 Unearned Income 
iv. Economic Value 
iv.10 Producer Rent 
iv.11 Capital Rent 
iv.12 Labor Rent 
Note: Structure of the EQx. The 12 pillars consist of a total of 72 indicators. 
 
We analyze elite quality along two dimensions: power and value, with value meaning 
current value creation/extraction activities as well potential future value creation/extraction 
activities. Furthermore, these two aspects have economic and political dimensions (Casas 2020 
forthcoming). This naturally provides a clear “structure of the various sub-groups of the 
phenomenon” (OECD 2008, 23) that is illustrated in Table 1. The two sub-indices Power and 
Value each contain a political and economic dimension, yielding four index areas. Each index area 
in turn measures three aspects of elite quality, conceptualized as pillars. Finally, each of these in 
total twelve pillars contain a set of individual indicators (between four and ten indicators each). 
Thus, the EQx condenses the complex phenomenon of elite quality in one number. Moreover, its 
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multi-layered architecture reflects the multidimensional nature of elite quality and thus allows for 
an in-depth analysis at different levels. 
 
3 Methodology 
We propose measuring elite quality by means of an index. Indices can summarize complex realities 
and provide an easy to interpret summary of a multi-dimensional phenomenon, without losing the 
underlying information base. This facilitates the communication of insights to decision-makers 
and the general public. Furthermore, the construction of a country ranking allows one to compare 
performances and, in the future, track progress over time (OECD 2008, 13f). The overarching 
objective of the process of index construction should be to make the procedure as clear and 
transparent and therefore justifiable as possible (Santeramo 2017, 135). In consequence, the 
underlying assumptions and methods used for our index construction are presented and evaluated 
in detail hereinafter. 
Furthermore, since the use of a protocol ensures homogeneity in the index construction 
process, structure follows by and large the recommendations of the “Checklist for building a 
composite indicator” presented by the OECD’s (2008) handbook of index construction. Its 
recommendations focus specifically on indices for country comparison and ranking (OECD 2008, 
5) 1F1F2. 
 
 
 
2
 The OECD (2008) handbook and its checklist constitute a widely established starting point for the construction as 
well as evaluation of composite indicators, see for instance Álvarez-Díaz et al. (2018, 6), Greco et al. (2019, 63f), 
Grupp and Schubert (2010, 69) and Ivaldi, Bonatti and Soliani (2016, 401). 
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3.1 Selection of indicators 
EQx indicators are selected according to the theoretical framework. Table A1 in the appendix lists 
and defines all indicators. Column (2) indicates whether an indicator primarily measures value 
creation or value extraction. 
Most indicators are defined such that higher values are better than lower values (“the higher 
the better”), or the reverse (“the lower the better”), thus measuring value creation linearly. We 
acknowledge that this approach does not do justice to the ambivalent nature of many indicators. 
Only a small set of indicators are defined as “deviation from optimum”, measuring value creation 
in a non-linear fashion. This is done to capture the detrimental effects of values being either higher 
or lower than some reference level. Online appendix B1 indicates the indicators that are non-linear 
measures of elite quality, as well as the chosen benchmark and underlying rationale. 
Furthermore, some indicators measure overlapping aspects of elite quality. This is allowed 
for, based on the following considerations. Firstly, using different sources to measure a similar 
aspect may help to address shortcomings in the data when an indicator covers only a particular set 
of countries, and allows to diversify the risk of mismeasurement. Secondly, in some cases, overlap 
is intended in order to emphasize a particular aspect 2F2F3. Thirdly, the indicators might complement 
each other by measuring a similar aspect from a different perspective 3F3F4. Finally, it should be noted 
 
3
 For example, the EQx includes both the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index (Institutional quality (DBI, 
i.2)) as a measure of overall institutional quality, as well as two of its indicators, Protecting Minority Investors 
(PMI, i.2) and Firm Entry Ratio (ENR, ii.6) in order to particularly take account of these two aspects. 
4
 For example, the index includes three indicators on gender equality: one indicator focuses on the political sphere 
by measuring the proportion of women serving in government bodies (Women Power Index (WIP, i.1)), another 
indicator focuses on gender inequality as a consequence of legislative barriers (Women, Business and the Law 
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that a potentially overemphasized aspect is not expected to dominate index scores, given the ample 
number of indicators considered. 
 
3.2 Data 
In order to measure country-level elite quality on the basis of relevant and up-to-date information, 
numerous datasets are collected from various international organizations. The sources are listed 
for each indicator in the appendix in Table A1, column (7). The data sources can be divided in 
three broad categories presented in Table 2. Column (4) in Table A1 classifies each indicator 
accordingly. Online appendix B2 provides further information on how the data was transformed 
to yield individual indicators. 
 
Table 2. Types of dataset sources 
Category Short description Example 
Index Source data is an existing composite indicator and/or country 
data have already been normalized 
Women Power Index (WPI, i.1) 
Raw Source data has not been transformed R&D % GDP (RND, ii.6) 
Proprietary Source data is gathered by EQx team [planned in the future] 
Note: Table indicates the types of data used for the indicators. 
 
To compute the EQx, we use the most recent available data. Most indicators use data from 
2018, and almost all indicators are based on data between 2016 and 2019.  Seven indicators are 
based on datasets older than 2016, up to 2012. This can be justified because these indicators (e.g. 
Political decentralization (PDE, i.1)) reflect phenomena deemed relatively stable. This is 
consistent with accepted index construction practice as generally, data limitations constrain the 
 
(WBL, i.3)) and another indicator considers the gender pay gap (Gender Wage Gap (GWG, iv.12)). Thus, these 
indicators measure gender equality from different perspectives and are in consequence included in different pillars. 
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temporal and geographical coverage of indicators, as well as other methodological decisions 
(Nardo et al. 2005, 35). That is, when constructing an internationally comparable measure, it is not 
unusual for indices to consider data on different years and for different sets of countries (Szerb 
and Acs 2011, 8-10; Alkire and Santos 2014, 257). Table 3 indicates the main facts on the 
geographical coverage of indicators. 
 
Table 3. Data constraints in geographical coverage – main figures 
% of indicators covering:  
 all Pilot32 countries >40% of EQx indicators  
 >30 Pilot32 countries  >55% of EQx indicators 
 >25 Pilot32 countries >70% of EQx indicators 
% of missing country datapoints overall 10% of observations  
Avg. number of available indicators per country 62.1 (out of maximum 72) 
Avg. number of countries covered by indicators 28 (out of maximum 32) 
Minimum number of indicators per country 40 (Botswana) 
Note: Main figures on the geographical coverage of indicators. Further information on the geographical and temporal 
coverage of the data are provided in Table B3 and B4 in the online appendix. 
 
Considering the international vocation and comparative perspective of the EQx, the long-
term aim is to measure elite quality for as many countries as possible, the aforementioned data 
constraints notwithstanding. As a result, the EQx2021 report will see the index extended from 32 
countries considered in the present paper to cover over 100. Acknowledging data constraints, 
decisions on index construction parameters are based on normative arguments that are discussed 
next. 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Imputation of missing data 
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Since no approach to impute missing data is exempt from drawbacks, we hereinafter judiciously 
document the chosen procedure. Fortunately, and further to the earlier notes, the considered 
datasets are generally characterized by a relatively good completeness.  
When addressing missing values, the aim is to avoid systematic upward or downward 
biases as a result of missing values. That is, a lack of data should not penalize or favor any country, 
but should solely influence the accuracy of its score, i.e. the more indicators are accounted for in 
the computation of the final country score, the more accurate the latter will be. 
The EQx addresses missing values based on two approaches. First, minimum requirements 
in terms of data availability are defined. Datasets are only considered if (1) they cover a minimum 
of 30% of the considered countries (here this corresponds to 9 countries), and (2) provide recent 
information on countries’ elite quality, i.e. by 2016 or later 4F4F5. Moreover, concerning the structure 
of the index, (3) pillars need to be based on a minimum of four indicators. 
Second, we implement an “available-case analysis” (Little and Rubin 2002, 54) that should 
only be used if the “amount of missing information is limited” (Little and Rubin 2002, 41). We 
argue that this is the case here, applying the above minimum requirements. In case an indicator is 
missing for a particular country, the weight of the missing data point is split between the remaining 
indicators of the same pillar, in proportion to their respective weights 5F5F6. This approach is also 
implemented in other indices, such as the Multidimensional Poverty Index (Alkire and Santos 2014, 
 
5
 With seven exceptions as explained in chapter 3.2. 
6
 In the present study, no pillar is missing all indicator values for a country. Anticipating aggravated data constraints 
when considering a larger set of countries in the course of the EQx2021 Report, the weight of the hypothetical 
missing pillar datapoint would be split between the two other pillar of the same index area, mirroring the approach 
for individual missing indicators. 
13 
 
256) 6F6F7. It is based on the premise that indicators within the same pillar, and pillars within the same 
index area, measure similar aspects of elite quality. Also, in case recent data is not available for 
only a small set of countries, missing values are imputed with the latest available data, up to three 
years prior to the data used for the majority of other countries. 
Importantly, the “available-case analysis” uses all available values, that is, the final EQx 
will see indicator datasets in part stemming from different years and covering a heterogeneous set 
of countries (Nardo et al. 2005, 54). This dents cross-country consistency across EQx scores in the 
same manner that it does with most indices. At the same time, EQx aims to offer valuable insights 
on aggregate elite quality at the single country level. The available-case analysis potentially 
implies a gain in efficiency since overall, more information is used to calculate index values, than 
if a “complete case analysis” was implemented (Nardo et al. 2005, 41). Furthermore, as 
emphasized by another composite indicator - the Environmental Performance Index (EPI) – “even 
 
7
 The reader should note that different approaches to the issue of missing data were considered, based on Little and 
Rubin (2002) who created a taxonomy of missing-data methods (consider Little and Rubin (2002, 19-21) for an 
overview). The easiest and most straightforward method, that we call ‘case deletion’, is to “discard incompletely 
recorded units and to analyze only the units with complete data” (p. 19). This is, however, unsuitable for the EQx 
because in the main 2020 report, nearly all considered datasets constitute a non-complete country list. Moreover, this 
technique often leads to “serious bias” (p.19) and loss of precision (higher standard errors) as useful information is 
left out. 
Another category covers the so-called “Imputation-Based Procedures” (p. 20). Here, the idea is to fill-in the missing 
values with substitute values. Nardo et al. (2005, 10-11) differentiate Single Imputation (e.g. use of 
“mean/median/mode, Regression Imputation, Expectation Maximization Imputations” as substitute) and Multiple 
Imputations techniques. While both of the above methods - representing a “complete case analysis” (Little and 
Rubin 2002, 41) - are widely used, EQx decided against it due to the size and heterogeneity of the EQx database. 
14 
 
less-than-ideal indicators contribute to the overall usefulness of the EPI as a composite index” 
(Wendling et al. 2018, 7). The same applies to the EQx. Note also that reassuringly, a range of 
robustness tests (see chapter 5) suggest that not only EQx scores, but, in particular the EQx ranking 
is robust to modifications in key modelling assumptions. This suggests that meaningful cross-
country comparisons are possible. 
 
3.4 Normalization 
Since indicators have different scales and measurement units, normalization is necessary prior to 
aggregating the data to “avoid adding up apples and oranges” (OECD 2008, 27). 
Indicators are standardized, with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one, applying z-
scores (Nardo et al. 2005, 47; OECD 2008, 28). This is done using the 95% trimmed mean and 
standard deviation, in order to use estimates that are less susceptible to outliers. Next, outliers are 
forced to fall within a ]-2;+2[ interval. This concerns roughly 6% of datapoints. The resulting z-
scores are then rescaled to fall within a ]0 ; 100[ interval. Hitherto, all EQx indicators were 
assigned a so-called directionality, being either the lower, the better; or the higher, the better; or 
the closer to 0 or an optimum, the better. In consequence, in a final step, normalized values are 
transformed such that a value close to 100 indicates a high level of elite quality, and a value close 
to 0 represents a low level of elite quality. Further information on the normalization process in 
provided in section B5 of the online appendix. 
 
3.5 Weighting and aggregation 
How to establish an appropriate weighting and aggregation method represents a contentious issue 
in the academic debate on the construction of indices (Santeramo 2017). While there are numerous 
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weighting techniques, the OECD (2008, 31) highlights that “regardless of which method is used, 
weights are essentially value judgements”. However, the (OECD 2008, 33) further highlights that 
“the absence of an “objective” way to determine weights and aggregation methods does not 
necessarily lead to rejection of the validity of composite indicators, as long as the entire process is 
transparent.” This is to be achieved by the following two sections 7F7F8. 
 
3.5.1 Weighting criteria theoretical background 
The theoretical framework, summarized in section 2, provides a clear structure to the index. The 
weights applied at each level (indicator, pillar, index area and sub-index) emerge from two 
different approaches: either they are deduced from the theoretical framework, or they are allocated 
by a group of experts employing a Budget Allocation Process (BAP). Weights are summarized in 
Table 4. 
The weights of the index’ main building blocks (sub-index and index areas) are deduced 
from conceptual deliberations (see Casas 2020 for a theoretical discussion). Conceptual 
Deliberation 1 argues that power is a necessary condition for value extraction. Accordingly, the 
sub-index Power can be interpreted as an indicator of future value extraction potential. We weight 
 
8
 By weighting the individual indicators, varied relevance can be attributed to them. Applying equal weights to all 
indicators is “by far” (Yang 2014, 6) the most commonly used method to avoid any subjective value judgements 
(OECD 2008, 31; Santeramo 2017, 132). This approach has been both criticized and endorsed (Chowdhury and 
Squire 2006). Crucially, equal weighting does not imply “no weights”, but carries an implicit value judgement of 
weights being equal. This might “disguise […] insufficient knowledge of […] relationships or a lack of consensus” 
(OECD 2008, 31). 
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present value extraction dynamics stronger than (potential) future ones, and thus at present the 
weighting judgment sees the sub-index Value at 66% while Power is weighted at 34%. 
 
Table 4. Weighting in the EQx 
Aggregation level Method Weights 
    
Sub-index  Within EQx Within EQx 
 Sub-index I: Power CD 1 34.0% 34.0% 
 Sub-index II: Value CD 1 66.0% 66.0% 
      
Index area  Within sub-index Within EQx 
 Sub-index I: Power    
  i. Political Power CD 2 34.0% 11.6% 
  ii. Economic Power CD 2 66.0% 22.4% 
 Sub-index II: Value    
  iii. Political Value CD 3 34.0% 22.4% 
  iv. Economic Value CD 3 66.0% 43.6% 
      
Pillar  Within index area Within EQx 
 Sub-index I: Power    
  i. Political Power    
   i.1 State Capture BAP 36.0% 4.2% 
   i.2 Regulatory Capture BAP 37.0% 4.3% 
   i.3 Human Capture BAP 27.0% 3.1% 
  ii. Economic Power    
   ii.4 Industry Dominance BAP 21.0% 4.7% 
   ii.5 Firm Dominance BAP 23.0% 5.2% 
   ii.6 Creative Destruction BAP 56.0% 12.6% 
 Sub-index II: Value    
  iii. Political Value    
   iii.7 Giving Income BAP 36.4% 8.1% 
   iii.8 Taking Income BAP 36.4% 8.1% 
   iii.9 Unearned Income BAP 27.2% 6.1% 
  iv. Economic Value    
   iv.10 Producer Rent BAP 29.0% 12.6% 
   iv.11 Capital Rent BAP 34.0% 14.8% 
   iv.12 Labor Rent BAP 37.0% 16.1% 
       
       
  Within pillar Within EQx 
Indicator BAP Table A1, column (5) Table A1, column (6) 
       
Note: Table indicates the underlying weighting method (Conceptual Deliberation (CD) or Budget Allocation Process (BAP)) 
and the resulting weighting for each aggregation level. The within EQx weights anticipate the linear aggregation scheme 
detailed in section 3.5.2. Percentages, rounded to one decimal, may not add up to 100 due to rounding. 
 
A similar rationale is applied for Conceptual Deliberation 2, establishing the weight of the 
index areas Economic Power and Political Power, within the sub-index Power. We argue that 
Political Power primarily reflects potentially extractive processes, as political may convert to 
economic power. Hence, the weights for the economic and political dimensions of the sub-index 
Power are established at 66% and 34%. On account of the larger relevance and impact of economic 
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value creation processes compared to political value creation processes, the same weights are also 
applied to the index areas Economic Value (66%) and Political Value (34%). 
The rationale of the underlying Conceptual Deliberation 3 assumes a higher relevance of 
the economic over the political dimension in the overall value creation process. 
The weights of the twelve pillars within their index areas, as well as the weight of the 
individual indicators within their pillars, are determined in the course of a Budget Allocation 
Process (BAP). The BAP (citing Moldan, Billharz and Matravers 1997; OECD 2008, 32) is a 
participatory method where experts are provided a budget, e.g. N points, that they allocate to an 
indicator or pillar. Intuitively, experts “pay” more for indicators they want to stress. 
Generally, the BAP is characterized by its “transparent and relatively straightforward 
nature and short duration” (OECD 2008, 96). Nardo et al. (2005, 67) highlight that the weighting 
is not based on “technical manipulations” but on experts’ opinions, which helps increase the 
legitimacy of the index. Furthermore, the BAP fosters the creation of a forum of discussion, thus 
promoting a consensus for policy actions. Hence, a BAP is the method chosen for EQx to 
determine the weights of individual indicators within their pillars, and the weights of pillars within 
their index areas. Further information on the exact procedure employed is provided in section B6 
in the online appendix. 
 
 
 
3.5.2 Aggregation  
Indicator aggregation represents another decisive and the final step in the computation of an index. 
Munda (2012, 337) argues that “what defines a composite indicator is the set of properties 
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underlying its mathematical aggregation convention”. Since, again, there is no “objective” 
approach to determine the optimal aggregation scheme (OECD 2008, 33), the implications of 
different aggregation methods should be considered carefully. 
The two most commonly adopted techniques are the geometric and linear aggregations8F8F9. 
Both methods imply some compensability between indicators, that is, a deficit in a country’s 
performance in one dimension can generally be compensated by a surplus in another dimension. 
However, the methods differ in the extend of compensability they allow. In the case of geometric 
aggregation, compensability is lower for an indicator with low values. In this case, scoring low on 
one indicator implies having to score substantially higher on other indicators to improve the overall 
score (OECD 2008, 33). This has led, for instance, to the aggregation of indicators building the 
Human Development Index (HDI) being switched from a linear to a geometric method in 2010, to 
acknowledge criticism that values of indicator “GDP per capita” should not compensate for low 
levels of “Life expectancy at birth” (Mazziotta and Pareto 2013, 68). 
Linear aggregation, on the other hand, implies a constant and full compensability among 
indicators (OECD 2008, 338; Munda 2012, 33). This means that “poor performance in some 
indicators can be compensated by sufficiently high values of other indicators” (Nardo et al. 2005, 
12). EQx applies a linear aggregation approach. Within pillars, indicators are assumed to measure 
similar aspects of elite quality, in consequence, a full compensability is allowed for. A similar 
reasoning applies for the aggregation of pillars within index areas. Concerning the aggregation of 
index areas and sub-indices, we highlight that linear aggregation transmits the relative importance 
 
9
 An index constructed based on two indicators with equal weights would result from (𝑥1 ∗ 𝑥2)1/2 in case of a 
geometric aggregation and 12 (𝑥1 + 𝑥2) in case of linear aggregation (Santeramo 2017, 131). 
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of dimensions to the index, as determined by the underlying weighting scheme (Santeramo 2017, 
131). Hence, a linear aggregation ensures a full transmission of the relative weights as implied by 
the theoretical framework. Summarizing, the EQx implements a linear aggregation scheme at each 
level of aggregation. This simple method, adopted by a vast majority of indices (Yang 2014, 5), 
contributes to an index that is in its construction process simple and easy to understand. 
This concludes the construction of the EQx, to measure the quality of national elites on 
aggregate. For an example on how indicators are weighted and aggregated to calculate index scores, 
consult section B7 in the online appendix. 
 
4 Results 
The EQx assesses the aggregate of a country’s elite business models in terms of relative value 
creation and value extraction. Table 5 provides an overview of the EQx for a set of 32 countries 9F9F10 
and reveals substantial differences in the state of elite quality across countries. 
Singapore ranks first, with a considerable lead. Interestingly, the sub-index Power shows 
that Singaporean elites are more powerful than e.g. advanced Western economies, hence 
penalizing Singapore with rank 15 in the Power sub-index. Yet due to a superb performance in the 
Value sub-index, Singapore manages to compensate its low Power score and thus sits atop the 
table in the EQx overall ranking. This indicates that Singaporean elites use their vast power for 
value creation rather than rent seeking purposes. 
 
10
 We conducted all calculations using two platforms to ensure that all calculations are double-checked. That is, all 
steps are conducted using Microsoft Excel, as well as using the Index Management Platform IMP, a novel Python-
based platform developed by dxFeed. Further details on the IMP can be found in the IMP document retrievable from 
www.elitequality.org. tbc link xx 
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Table 5. EQx results 
 
 EQx  Sub-Index 
   Power (I)  Value (II) 
Country Rank Score  Rank Score  Rank Score 
Singapore 1 68.5  15 59.2  1 73.4 
Switzerland 2 64.9  5 63.8  2 65.5 
Germany 3 64.2  3 65.0  3 63.7 
United Kingdom 4 63.9  2 70.6  7 60.5 
United States 5 63.4  1 70.7  8 59.6 
Australia 6 63.2  8 63.4  4 63.1 
Canada 7 61.9  9 62.7  5 61.5 
Japan 8 61.6  10 62.0  6 61.4 
Korea, Rep. 9 61.2  4 65.0  9 59.3 
Sweden 10 59.7  11 61.8  10 58.6 
Norway 11 58.6  13 60.2  13 57.8 
China 12 58.4  19 58.2  11 58.5 
Poland 13 58.3  17 58.5  12 58.2 
Portugal 14 58.0  12 61.4  15 56.3 
France 15 57.4  7 63.4  16 54.3 
Israel 16 56.9  6 63.5  19 53.5 
Italy 17 55.5  16 58.6  18 53.9 
Spain 18 55.5  14 59.9  21 53.2 
Kazakhstan 19 52.7  28 43.5  14 57.5 
Indonesia 20 52.0  22 49.2  20 53.5 
Mexico 21 50.7  25 47.4  22 52.4 
Saudi Arabia 22 49.2  30 40.0  17 53.9 
Russian Federation 23 48.9  24 48.3  25 49.2 
Botswana 24 48.9  29 42.7  23 52.0 
India 25 45.4  23 48.4  27 43.8 
Pakistan 26 44.5  32 32.5  24 50.7 
Brazil 27 44.1  20 50.2  28 41.0 
Turkey 28 43.3  21 49.2  29 40.3 
Nigeria 29 42.4  31 34.7  26 46.4 
South Africa 30 41.7  18 58.5  32 33.1 
Argentina 31 41.6  26 47.1  30 38.7 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 32 40.0  27 44.2  31 37.8 
Note: Table indicates index scores and ranking for the overall EQx and its two sub-indices. 
 
A political economy configuration running in the opposite direction to Singapore can be 
observed in the two Anglo-Saxon economies: The United Kingdom (ranking 4th) and the United 
States (5th). The leading ranks in the Power sub-index imply that American and British elites are 
the least powerful of all considered countries. However, despite their relative weakness, they 
manage to run value extraction business models, and thus rank only 7th and 8th in the Value sub-
index. 
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Members of the European Union (EU) vary significantly in their elite quality. Germany 
comes in 3rd in the overall EQx ranking as well as in the two sub-indices Power and Value. Sweden 
and Norway (rank 10 and 11) build a Scandinavian cluster, obtaining similar scores both in the 
EQx as well as the two sub-indices. Finally, France, Italy and Spain are at the rear of the considered 
EU countries, ranking 15th, 17th and 18th. 
China comes in 12th in the EQx list and thus outranks several advanced European 
economies like France, as well as other upper-middle income countries (classification of the World 
Bank 2020b) such as Russia (ranking 23rd), Turkey (28th) and South Africa (30th). With Brazil and 
India ranking 25th and 27th, a split in the BRICS countries between China and the four other 
countries is clearly visible at EQx. Chinese elites are slightly more powerful than elites in 
Singapore and roughly as powerful as elites in Poland or South Africa. South African elites, 
however, score lowest of all surveyed countries in terms of their current value creation activities, 
reflected in the last rank of the Value sub-index. 
Indices provide specific analytical perspectives. For instance, the Global Competitiveness 
Index (GCI) sheds light on the competitiveness of countries, and the United Nations Human 
Development Index (HDI) on different levels of human development. Thus, indices enable the 
interpretation of the relative current position of a country in terms of what the index measures and 
provides intelligence on other relevant outcomes (e.g. competitiveness can lead to economic 
growth and human development). Hereinafter, we illustrate the usefulness of the EQx as an 
analytical framework and tool to analyze the political economy of countries, in three different ways. 
Firstly, we provide three exemplary country portraits, on the United States (U.S.), Germany and 
Portugal. See Figures A1, A2, and A2 in the appendix for the three EQx country scorecards that 
ground the analysis. Secondly, taking up on the distributive implications of the concept of elite 
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quality, we investigate how the EQx relates to two measures of inequality. And thirdly, we 
compare the EQx to renowned measures of general economic and human development. 
 
4.1 Country analysis 
4.1.1 United States 
The United States (U.S.) ranks 5th in the overall EQx ranking. However, taking a closer look at the 
index’ components reveals substantial differences across different domains representing the 
comparative strengths and weaknesses of its political economy. EQx might supply insight to the 
present social context and the renewed commitment to build an inclusive economy. 
The most striking finding of EQx is the contrast within the Economic Power index area, 
between the pillars Industry Dominance (ii.4) and Firm Dominance (ii.5). The U.S. economy is 
well balanced and diverse and hence no industry dominance is attested by the top spot in the global 
rank of pillar Industry Dominance (ii.4). Yet at the individual firm level, the exact opposite occurs: 
extremely powerful firms dominate the economy and the U.S. scores a dreary 28th rank in pillar 
Firm Dominance (ii.5). The interpretation is that America does not have an institutional problem 
as much as it has a dominant firm problem. That is, dominant firms appear to manage to operate 
under the radar of America’s exemplary institutional set-up, in order to rent seek, albeit moderately. 
This could explain the puzzle of why despite being the country that scores highest in Power (sub-
index I) it has a good but not excellent Value (sub-index II) score - extractive business models are 
a feature of its political economy. The final interpretative twist is that the U.S. scores exceedingly 
high (global no. 1) in pillar ii.6 Creative Destruction, based on an above average performance in 
the indicators Entrepreneurship (ENT), VC finance (VCK), Barriers to start-ups (BTS) and R&D % 
GDP (RND). This means that the institutional arrangements leave the doors open for value creators 
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to replace value extractors, explaining why the U.S. economy has traditionally reinvented itself 
successfully after structural crises. 
Furthermore, the EQx points to value extraction in specific pillar level areas that see the 
U.S. as notable outliers. For instance, it takes rank 30 in Ease to Challenge Regulations (i.2, ECR), 
rank 24 in Billionaires’ wealth as a percent of GDP (ii.5, BIW), rank 24 in the Homicide rate (iii.8, 
HOM), rank 28 in Government Debt as % of GDP (iii.9) and rank 29 in Health Care as % of GDP 
(dev. fm optimum) (iv.10, DHC). Hence, despite an above-average rank in the overall elite quality, 
the EQx analytical framework denotes the particular areas in the American political economy that 
are liable of improvement. 
Summarizing, the high Power sub-index rank points to the U.S. as a self-correcting system, 
with value extracting business models by a priori limited by robust institutional arrangements that 
extractive elites will not be able to challenge.  If value creating elites and sectors of the economy 
would only unleash the full potential of America’s institutional strengths, the U.S. could easily 
climb atop the world’s elite quality ranking, and new degrees of inclusive human and economic 
development would be felt across its diverse society. 
 
4.1.2 Germany 
Germany comes in at a very strong 3rd place in the EQx global rank, with critical areas 
underperforming. By reviewing EQx data, it is possible to identify areas where Germany ought to 
focus in terms of institutional reform in order to incentivize increased degrees of value creation. 
Within the Economic Value index areas, two pillars offer a contrasting picture. The 
Producer Rent (iv.10) pillar has Germany at an excellent no. 3 position with its traditional export-
oriented economic elite exposed to competition and shunning extractive models. The main 
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exception here is the indicator FDI net inflows as % of GDP (FDI) where it ranks 14th, pointing to 
an economy closed to foreign entrants and hence potentially open to rent seeking by domestic 
players. On the other hand, the finance sector is quite extractive, with the Capital Rent (iv.11) pillar 
ranking at 19th, indicating the need for elite business model transformation especially as the 
country performs worse than many of its EU peers. 
In terms of Political Value, the big paradox is between the pillars Taking Income (iii.8, 
rank3) and Giving Income (iii.7, rank 19). The state is not extractive at all when taxing and 
otherwise “taking” from society at large, as it encourages value creation– in the indicators Fiscal 
decentralization (FED) or Corporate tax rate (dev. fm optimum) (DCT) Germany leads the world 
(both rank 1). But when it comes to giving, the state impedes value creation. For instance, while it 
provides excellent value evidenced by phenomenal Covid-19 safety (COV) results, it has dismal 
results in terms of Regional redistribution as % of government budget (REG) at rank 29, or in 
Subsidies and transfers as % of expenses (SNT) at rank 26. 
The variance found in the different EQx levels and areas should inform policy and social 
debates. Perspectives might be selected by the analysist - for instance, the fundamental issue facing 
Germany might be said to be exposed by EQx’ Creative Destruction Pillar (ii.6), where the country 
ranks a middling 14th. The fact that EQx constituent indicator scores often paint different pictures 
highlights the importance of a multidimensional, wholistic but nuanced view of the economy. Here 
we might say that Germany’s incumbent elites block potential new value creators from realizing 
their potential. The country’s excellent scores in many EQx index areas mean that the pre-
conditions for value creation by potential disruptors are present – disruptors would invariable 
emerge in Germany meaning substantial unrealized opportunity and waste. 
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4.1.3 Portugal 
After joining the European Community in 1986, Portugal experienced a period of real convergence 
with its European partners until 2000. Since then, with the single currency, its economic 
performance deteriorated to the point that, after the 2008-10 crisis, it had to call upon external aid 
to meet its commitments. Today Portugal grows below the E.U. average, it is not competitive, and 
it is one of the most indebted member states, heavily dependent on the external sector - tourism in 
particular. 
Despite this economic context, Portuguese elites have a middling score (rank 14th) in the group of 
the sampled countries, ranking better than others in the southern Europe such as Italy (rank 17th) 
or Spain (rank 18th) and even better than France (rank 15th). This could be a catalyst for a new 
phase of real convergence with the E.U., already initiated before the current pandemic crisis, but 
which has caused a major setback in such endeavour.  
However, this overall score hides great disparities in the four sub-index areas, revealing a better 
performance in terms of value creation by the economic elites (iv, rank 10th) and worse in terms 
of Political Value (iii, rank 25th).  
Emphasis should be placed on the good performance in terms of trade freedom (TRF, iv.10, rank 
6th), barriers to entry (BTE, iv.10, rank 7th), foreign direct investment attraction (FDI and BTF, 
iv.10, rank 7th and 1st, respectively) and economic globalisation (EGL, iv, rank 6th). These results 
are in line with the fact that Portugal is a small economy open to the exterior, that promoted a 
series of privatizations (SOE, iii.9, rank 9th) and a "golden visa" programme as a form of external 
financing. The country has also been able to attract several technological investments due to the 
competitive value of its qualified labour. 
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Despite the good performance in terms of Economic Value, there are still great opportunities for 
improvement such as unemployment (EMU, iv.12, rank 22nd), and in particular youth 
unemployment (YUN, iv.12, rank 20th), and the health care services (DHC, iv.10, rank 20th). The 
covid-19 pandemic crisis has made the need to correct the weaknesses of the health system all the 
more evident.  
The worse performance in terms of Political Value stems from significant regional disparities 
(REG, iii.7, rank 25th), the low quality of public services (GPS, iii.7, rank 19th), the huge corporate 
tax burden (DCT, iii.7, rank 25th) all which contribute to the weak competitiveness of the 
Portuguese economy and low level of investment along with the high and extractive general tax 
burden (DTR, iii.7, rank 21st). In this respect, the mediocre nature of public expenditure (DBT, 
iii.9, rank 29th), which represents a strong extraction of value from future taxpayers’ generations, 
should also be highlighted. 
As for political and the economic power, Portugal outperforms the average of surveyed countries. 
Small countries are often at risk to be at the mercy of powerful elites, yet Portugal boasts high 
competition due to the good firm entry and exit dynamics in several markets. In this context, the 
number of large companies is small, contributing to a low concentration of the economic power.  
The results at the level of Political Power derive mainly from E.U. membership (Political 
Globalization, rank 8th) and from the effective institutional arrangements of municipalism, regional 
coordination commissions and its autonomous regions (Political Decentralization, rank 8th). 
Additionally, the imposition of quotas for gender diversity in public offices, in the state-owned 
business sector and in public companies contributes to the good performance in this area (WBL, 
i.3, rank 4th). 
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4.2 Elite quality and inequality 
Since the EQx represents the first attempt to measure the novel concept of elite quality, index 
scores cannot be directly validated by comparing them to some existing measure thereof. However, 
the underlying theoretical framework hints at distributive implications of different levels of elite 
quality: with high quality elites giving more than they take, a country scoring high on the EQx is 
expected to be characterized by a more equal society, and vice versa. Interestingly, this is indeed 
the case. The following two scatterplots in Figure 1 show how the EQx relates to two measures of 
inequality: the share of pre-tax national income accruing to the top 10% (on the left) and the Gini 
index (on the right). A lower score in one of the inequality measures indicates a more equal society. 
The negative correlation with the Gini index (Pearson correlation coefficient: -0.525) as 
well as the share of pre-tax national income accruing to the top 10% (-0.773) is quite important. 
In fact, with all equality indicators omitted for the analysis10F10F11, the focus can be drawn on the power 
and value aspects of elites. The negative correlation with the Gini index may suggest that better 
elites, by favoring aggregate growth, investment, and innovation, produce benefits especially to 
the middle- and lower-income strata of the population. Conversely, low quality elites take 
advantage of their power to increase their wealth at the expense of the less powerful, and usually 
poorer, segments of society. Hence better elites reduce inequality, while bad elites running 
extractive business models increase it. 
 
11
 Before the EQx is related to each inequality measure, a purged EQx is calculated that omits the two inequality 
related indicators Billionaire’s wealth as % of GDP (ii.5 BIW) and Top 10% share of pre-tax national income (iii.8 
INE). 
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Figure 1. Elite quality and inequality. 
Note: The dashed line indicates a fitted regression line. The purged EQx omits all inequality related 
indicators. 
 
Of course, a correlation is no proof of causation. It could be possible that a long history of 
inclusive institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) allow the least powerful social classes to 
keep the more powerful elites in check away of rent seeking, thereby preventing them to abuse of 
their power and to appropriate a too large share of value added.  However, in either case, from a 
policy perspective our index appears to provide a promising lever to achieve the social objective 
of combined efficiency and equality. 
4.3 Comparative analysis of the EQx with other indices 
We gauge the explanatory space of the EQx by investigating how the EQx relates to other 
established indices. We compare the EQx to six indices of different domains of human and 
economic development: (1) the Ease of Doing Business Index or DB (World Bank 2020a) which 
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assesses the regulatory framework faced by the private sector, (2) the Global Competitiveness 
Index or GCI (Schwab 2019) which tracks national competitiveness, (3) the Global Innovation 
Index or GII (Cornell University, INSEAD and WIPO 2019), (4) the Human Development Index 
or HDI (United Nations Development Programme 2019) which measures human development, (5) 
the Environmental Performance Index (2020) or EP which summarizes environmental and 
sustainability issues, and (6) an indicator for Happiness retrieved from the World Happiness 
Report (Helliwell et al. 2020). 
Table 6 provides the correlation coefficients between indices. Since the DB, GCI and EPI 
serve as a basis for some the EQx indicators 11F11F12, the EQx is purged from the respective indicators 
before examining the relation between the resulting adjusted EQx and the DB, GCI and EPI, 
respectively. 
A key question that research on elite quality will have to address is whether EQx has its 
own explanatory space on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Regarding the latter, the 
comparison with other indices provides initial answers. The differences in Pearson correlation 
coefficients are small but revealing, implying that EQx is empirically not disassociated from 
leading indices. The question then becomes the extent to which a comparative analysis tells us 
something other indices do not. From an applied perspective, the question is whether the 
differences are relevant for policy in terms of suggesting discrete measures. We know, for instance, 
 
12
 The DB enters the EQx in three ways: (1) as indicator i.2 DBI Institutional quality, as well as via two of DB’s 
own indicators that enter the EQx as indicators: (2) i.2 PMI Protecting minority investors and (3) II.6 ENR Firm 
entry ratio. Similarly, three of the GCI’s own indicators enter the EQx as indicators: (1) i.1 GRC Government’s 
responsiveness to change, (2) i.2 ECR Ease to challenge regulations, (3) iv.11 DOI inflation (dev. fm optimum). The 
EPI enters the EQx as an individual indicator iii.9 EPI Environmental Performance Index. 
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that for the Gini index, even small differences can have a large social impact and are worth 
addressing. 
 
Table 6. Pearson correlation coefficients between EQx and other indices 
 
xEQ 
(1) 
DB 
(2) 
GCI 
(3) 
GII 
(4) 
HDI 
(5) 
EPI 
(6) 
Happiness 
(7) 
xEQ 1       
DB 0.831 1      
GCI 0.931 0.871 1     
GII 0.88 0.796 0.946 1    
HDI 0.794 0.792 0.890 0.815 1   
EPI 0.733 0.641 0.829 0.819 0.881 1  
Happiness 0.678 0.559 0.727 0.694 0.771 0.810 1 
Note: EQx indicators based on the DB, GCI and EPI are respectively omitted from the EQx when calculating the pairwise 
correlation between DB, GCI and EPI with the EQx in column (1). Coefficients are rounded to three decimals. All correlation 
coefficients are significant at the 0.1% level. 
 
Figure 2 hence illustrates the correlation coefficients from a different perspective, showing 
the distances of each index in relation to other indices. We find that the EQx’ set of correlations 
(on the far left) are more clustered than those of the DB, EPI or the Happiness indicator, which is 
not surprising, as they measure more specific, discrete phenomena like institutions or the 
environment. At the same time, the correlation coefficients are more spread out than those of the 
GCI and HDI, possibly indicating that EQx transcends the phenomenological range captured by 
these indices. One might claim EQx’s positioning as a ‘bridge space’ between two types of indices, 
the narrow, contained phenomena indices and the more general economic and human development 
indices. Specifically, GCI’s stronger correlation with the set of selected indices might imply that 
EQx extends the explanatory power of competitiveness with a novel conceptual perspective on 
elites, i.e., the two indices do not overlap and rather are complementary in context of policymaking. 
For DB’s institutional quality index, a theme for further research would be one of directionality 
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and whether elite quality is the independent variable for certain social and economic indicators it 
theoretically purports to be. 
 
 Figure 2. Distances among leadig human and economic devleopement indices, illustrating 
correlation coefficients acrross indices. 
 
In short, this section’s examination shows the potential of EQx to provide insight and 
policy ideas in a manner similar to what other leading indices do. The comparative discussion vis-
à-vis existing indices will be ongoing as EQx establishes a unique empirical place to complement 
its theoretical positioning, resulting in an explanatory space for elite quality potentially relevant in 
the areas of economics, development and public policy, both from research and applied 
perspectives. 
5 Sensitivity analysis 
The following section has two goals. Firstly, to validate the judgement calls discussed in the 
methodology section and secondly, to address the critical view that data constraints limit the cross-
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country comparability of EQx scores. This is achieved by gauging how sensitive the EQx scores 
and country ranking are, ceteris paribus, to changes in key modelling assumptions and 
modifications of its setup (OECD 2008, 34; Santeramo 2017, 131). 
We refer to the EQx calculated according to the previously discussed methodology as 
baseline EQx. The robustness of the baseline EQx is tested by comparing country scores and 
rankings across alternative specifications. In most cases, this is accomplished by computing 
Spearman and Kendall Tau-b correlation coefficients, i.e. two non-parametric measures of the 
strength and direction of statistical association, between the rankings (OECD 2008, 81). Thus, the 
similarity in the baseline and alternative ranking can be quantified and assessed. This approach is 
widely used, for instance to investigate the robustness of the Corruption Perceptions Index 
(Álvarez-Díaz et al. 2018, 10ff), the European Well-being Index (Ivaldi, Bonatti and Soliani 2016, 
409), and the Multidimensional Poverty Index (Alkire and Santos 2014, 260ff). 
The following sections assess the index’ sensitivity with respect to the (1) selection of 
indicators, (2) data quality, (3) choice of normalization scheme, (4) choice of weighting scheme, 
and (5) choice of aggregation scheme. 
 
5.1 Leave-one-out robustness 
The first test aims at showing the balanced structure of the EQx. Are all the 12 pillars similarly 
important? Are some of them redundant, or, on the contrary, dominating index scores? We test the 
impact of each pillar on EQx scores and ranking, by excluding one pillar at a time, following the 
approach presented by Álvarez-Díaz et al. (2018, 21). Figure 3 illustrates the deviation (EQx minus 
simulation) from baseline scores (left) and baseline ranks (right). The distribution of the 
differences in country scores is illustrated by vertical lines for each excluded pillar. Boxes include 
33 
 
50% of all countries and the horizontal line within a box indicates the median. A small box and 
short vertical line close to the zero-difference horizontal red dashed line indicates that the 
respective pillar does not significantly affect the final index score (left figure) or ranking (right 
figure). 
 
 
Figure 3. Deviation from baseline EQx when excluding one pillar at a time. 
 
In terms of its effect on index scores, pillar 6 is the most influential pillar. Its omission 
would lead to higher index scores for all countries. Most importantly, all pillars contribute 
somewhat to EQx scores. 
However, small changes might imply substantial shifting in the ranking. As can be seen in 
the right figure, pillar 12 being the most influential pillar, its omission potentially shifts a country’s 
ranking the most. However, the tests show that for 50% of countries, omitting a pillar affects their 
ranking by only up to one position for the first ten pillars, and up to a maximum of two positions 
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for pillars 11 and 12. The median deviation from the baseline EQx rank is zero or close to zero in 
each case. Omitting one of the pillars 1, 2, 3, 5 or 9 does not affect the rank position at all for 
almost all countries. 
Figures B1 and B2 in the online appendix test the sensitivity of the index to the selection 
of underlying indicators and show the deviation from baseline scores and ranking when excluding 
one indicator at a time. Reassuringly, in almost all cases, excluding one indicator does not change 
the rank of a country at all or only by one rank. Hence, we conclude that while all indicators and 
pillars contribute somehow to the EQx, with some possibly having a larger impact than others, no 
indicator and no pillar dominates the final ranking. 
 
5.2 Implications of data constraints 
An obvious concern is that missing values are not missing entirely at random but based on a 
systematic pattern (OECD 2008, 24): data availability might be related to a country’s elite quality. 
This could represent an endogeneity bias for the EQx. The scatterplot in Figure 4 illustrates the 
relation between EQx country scores, and the number of indicators used for calculation. On 
average, the EQx is calculated using 61.1 indicators. Botswana has the least data (40 indicators), 
while Germany and the United Kingdom have the most (71 indicators). 
As suspected, there generally appears to be a positive relation between data availability, 
i.e. the number of indicators used for index computation, and resulting index scores. The 
scatterplot roughly takes the shape of an inverse-L. Countries with more data tend to score higher 
on the EQx. Unsurprisingly, the Pearson correlation coefficient is positive and amounts to 0.559. 
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 Figure 4. Data availability and EQx scores. 
 
However, it seems that this relation is not particularly strong. We use a multiple 
comparison test to compare the mean of EQx country scores grouped per number of indicators 
used for score calculation. We calculate t-tests distinguishing four groups: countries that have data 
on (1) 60 indicators or less, (2) between 61 and 64 indicators, (3) between 65 and 67 indicators, 
and more than 68 indicators. Applying a Bonferroni correction for multiple testing, the four group 
means of EQx scores are not different from each other at the 5% significance level. 
More importantly, a positive relation between country scores and data availability is not 
necessarily an indicator of a bias: high quality elites may allow for and foster the collection of data 
irrespective of the outcome, while conditions might not be favorable for data collection in countries 
with low quality elites. Provided the existing indicators are unbiased, index values are not biased, 
but less precise. The state of elite quality is depicted using less, but nevertheless correct, 
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information. We are confident that this argument applies here, since the EQx uses data of renowned 
and trustworthy international organizations. 
 
5.3 Robustness to the normalization scheme 
As outlined in section 3.4, data is normalized using the 95% trimmed mean and standard deviation, 
in order to obtain robust estimates of the mean and the standard deviation that are less susceptible 
to outliers. Since the bottom and top 2.5% of the data are thus excluded for computation, this 
implies a loss of information. We evaluate the sensitivity of the EQx to this method, by calculating 
index scores using several trimming thresholds during the normalization process. Table 7 shows 
that the resulting rankings are highly correlated with the baseline ranking: the correlation 
coefficients approach unity. This suggests that the EQx is stable to changes in the trimming 
threshold used for normalization. 
 
Table 7. Correlation coefficients between the EQx and alternative ranking using different 
trimming thresholds 
 No trimming 97.5% trimming 92.5% trimming 90% trimming 
Kendall Tau-b 0.944*** 0.988*** 0.988*** 0.980*** 
Spearman 0.992*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.998*** 
Note: Coefficients are rounded to three decimals. Both Kendall and Spearman correlation coefficients are significant at the 
1% level. 
 
 
 
5.4 Robustness to the weighting scheme 
As detailed in section 3.5.1, the EQx weighting scheme is established by a panel of experts and 
based on conceptual deliberations. While the chosen approach is based on careful theoretical 
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considerations, key insights must be robust to a plausible range of weights. Table 8 compares the 
baseline ranking to the index ranking resulting from several alternative weighting schemes and 
shows the respective Kendall Tau-b and Spearman rank correlation coefficients. Columns (2) to 
(6) apply equal weighting at different aggregation levels, representing a less fine-grained approach 
than for the baseline specification. Column (7) takes this to the extreme, calculating index values 
as an unweighted mean of all indicators. Columns (8) to (11) vary the weighting of the two sub-
indices, and column (12) applies equal weighting at the index area and sub-index level. 
Unsurprisingly, the correlation coefficients are lower the more the weighting scheme is 
modified. The lowest correlation coefficient is obtained in column (6) when weighting all elements 
equally within their level of aggregation, representing a fairly strong modification of the baseline 
weighting scheme. The resulting Kendall Tau-b (Spearman) correlation coefficient still amounts 
to 0.762 (0.924). Furthermore, the index ranking appears relatively robust to modifications in the 
weighting at the highest aggregation level, the sub-indices, with the Kendall Tau-b correlation 
coefficients not being lower than 0.895 (column (11). All correlation coefficients are significant 
at the 1% level. Hence, we conclude that the EQx ranking is largely robust to slight and even far 
reaching modifications in the underlying weighting scheme. 
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Table 8. Robustness to alternative weighting schemes 
 EQx 
(1) 
Altern. 1 
(2) 
Altern. 2 
(3) 
Altern. 3 
(4) 
Altern. 4 
(5) 
Altern. 5 
(6) 
Altern. 6 
(7) 
Altern. 7 
(8) 
Altern. 8 
(9) 
Altern. 9 
(10) 
Altern. 10 
(11) 
Altern. 11 
(12) 
Indicator weight within pillar BAP equal ✓ equal equal equal Equally 
weighted 
indicators 
without 
any other 
structure; 
individua
l final 
indicator 
weight: 0.0138̅ 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Pillar weight within index area BAP ✓ equal equal equal equal ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Index area weight within sub-index            
 Political Power 0.34 ✓ ✓ ✓ equal equal ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ equal 
 Economic Power 0.66 ✓ ✓ ✓ equal equal ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ equal 
 Political Value 0.34 ✓ ✓ ✓ equal equal ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ equal 
 Economic Value 0.66 ✓ ✓ ✓ equal equal ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ equal 
Sub-indices            
 Power 0.33 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ equal 0.25 0.4 0.45 equal equal 
 Value 0.67 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ equal 0.75 0.6 0.55 equal equal 
Kendall Tau-b 1 0.935*** 0.944*** 0.903*** 0.855*** 0.762*** 0.766*** 0.968*** 0.972*** 0.923*** 0.895*** 0.891*** 
Spearman 1 0.99*** 0.991*** 0.983*** 0.968*** 0.924*** 0.93*** 0.996*** 0.997*** 0.987*** 0.980*** 0.978*** 
Note:  The above part of the table shows the weighting scheme used for the EQx (column (1)), as well as 11 alternative weighting schemes (column (2) to (12)). “BAP” indicates 
weights determined by the Budget Allocation Process, “equal” indicates equal weighting within the respective level. The check mark indicates that the baseline weighting scheme 
is not changed. The lower part of the table indicates the Kendall Tau-b and Spearman correlation coefficient between the EQx ranking and a ranking using an alternative weighting 
scheme. Coefficients are rounded to three decimals. Both Kendall and Spearman correlation coefficients are significant at the 1% level. 
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5.5 Robustness to the aggregation scheme 
Next, we examine the EQx’ sensitivity towards the underlying function form. We propose to 
structure this discussion by considering the three benchmark special cases of the constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) function (Arrow et al. 1961, 230). Using a CES function, the aggregation 
scheme at each level of aggregation (indicators to pillar, pillars into index area, index areas into 
sub-index and sub-indices into final index) can be defined by 
 ?̅?𝐶𝐸𝑆 = (∑ 𝑤𝑘𝑥𝑘𝜎−1𝜎𝑀𝑘=1 ) 𝜎𝜎−1 (1) 
where 𝑀 indicates the number of elements within the considered aggregation level, 𝑥𝑘 indicates 
the value of element 𝑘, and 𝑤𝑘  its weight. Recall that weights within each aggregation level are 
characterized by 𝑤𝑘𝜖[0,1] and ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝑀𝑘=1 = 1 and are obtained from section 3.5.1. The parameter 𝜎𝜖[0, +∞] indicates the elasticity of substitution. We consider three cases that are listed in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. Alternative aggregation schemes 
 
 Considered 𝜎 Implied CES  
 Case 1 𝜎 → ∞  ?̅?𝑙𝑖𝑛 = ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑀𝑘=1    
 Case 2 𝜎 → 1  ?̅?𝑔𝑒𝑜 = ∏ 𝑥𝑘𝑤𝑘𝑀𝑘=1    
 Case 3 𝜎 → 0  ?̅?𝑚𝑖𝑛 = min (𝑥1, 𝑥2 … , 𝑥𝑁)   
 Note: The cases 0 < 𝜎 < 1  and 1 < 𝜎 < ∞  are also mathematically 
possible. However, these cases are not meaningful in the context of an 
index, since the resulting scores are not restricted to the 0 to 100 range 
specified for the EQx. 
 
 
In the first case, when 𝜎 → ∞, the CES takes a linear form (Saito 2012, 5). This approach 
implies constant and full compensability between the aggregated elements (perfect substitutes) 
(OECD 2008, 33; Munda 2012, 338).The EQx applies this linear aggregation method, where a 
weighted arithmetic mean is taken at each level of aggregation. 
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However, one might argue, that scoring low in one sub-index should imply having to score 
substantially higher in the other sub-index to improve the overall score, implying a lower level of 
compensability. This can be realized with a CES where 𝜎 goes to one, yielding an aggregation 
scheme where a geometric mean is taken at each level of aggregation (Case 2). This functional 
form is the well-known Cobb-Douglas function (Saito 2012, 7). 
Alternatively, one might argue that index aggregation should not allow for any 
substitutability between the aggregated elements. With the elasticity of substitution converging to 
zero (Case 3), the CES can be transformed to yield the Leontief function (Csontos and Ray 1992, 
237). In this case, the aggregated values are constrained by the minimum value of the considered 
elements (Saito 2012, 1). 
The sensitivity of the EQx towards the underlying functional form is assessed by applying 
the described functional forms at different levels of aggregation. Note that the EQx method to 
address missing values builds upon the assumption that indicators within the same pillar measure 
the same phenomenon, implying full compensability between indicators. Hence, this method can 
only be meaningfully applied using the linear aggregation scheme. In consequence, for all 
alternative specifications, the aggregation of indicators to pillars remains unchanged to the baseline 
(linear aggregation) and alternative aggregation schemes are only considered for the remaining, 
higher levels of aggregation. 
Table 10 compares eight alternative methods to the baseline aggregation scheme. 
Reassuringly, the EQx and alternative rankings are highly and significantly correlated. When using 
a geometric scheme at any one of the considered aggregation levels, the Kendall Tau-b (Spearman) 
correlation coefficient amounts to at least 0.984 (0.999) (column 4). Applying a Leontief function 
at one of the considered aggregation levels implies a ranking with a Kendall Tau-b (Spearman) 
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correlation coefficient of 0.762 (0.919) (column 6) or higher. Even when using a Leontief function 
for all considered aggregation levels, the Kendall Tau-b (Spearman) correlation coefficient still 
amounts to 0.585 (0.733) and remains highly significant. These results suggest that the EQx is 
largely robust to its underlying functional form. 
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Table 10. Robustness to alternative aggregation schemes 
 
 
 
 
EQx 
(1) 
Altern. 1 
(2) 
Altern. 2 
(3) 
Altern. 3 
(4) 
Altern. 4 
(5) 
Altern. 5 
(6) 
Altern. 6 
(7) 
Altern. 7 
(8) 
Altern. 8 
(9) 
Indicators to pillar linear ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Pillars to index area linear geometric ✓ ✓ geometric Leontief ✓ ✓ Leontief 
Index Areas to sub-index linear ✓ geometric ✓ geometric ✓ Leontief ✓ Leontief 
Sub-indices to index linear ✓ ✓ geometric geometric ✓ ✓ Leontief Leontief 
Kendall Tau-b 1 0.96*** 0.996*** 0.984*** 0.96*** 0.762*** 0.911*** 0.843*** 0.585*** 
Spearman 1 0.993*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.994*** 0.919*** 0.986*** 0.957*** 0.733*** 
Note:  The above part of the table shows the aggregation scheme used for the EQx (column (1)), as well as eight alternative aggregation schemes (column (2) to (9)). Three 
methods are compared: a “linear” scheme explained by Case 1, a “geometric” scheme laid out by Case 2, and a “Leontief” scheme presented by Case 3 (see Table 7). The check 
mark indicates that the baseline weighting scheme is not changed. The lower part of the table indicates the Kendall Tau-b and Spearman correlation coefficient between the EQx 
ranking and a ranking using an alternative aggregation scheme. Coefficients are rounded to three decimals. Both Kendall and Spearman correlation coefficients are significant at 
the 1% level. 
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6 Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was two-fold. Firstly, we proposed a sound and transparent methodology to 
comprehensively measure the novel concept of elite quality. The EQx index provides an easy to 
interpret summary, a practice-oriented heuristic, of the various conceptual political economy 
dimensions of the elite quality construct, by providing a solution to aggregate the microeconomic 
perspective of value creation business models. As a result, it allows us to compare the performance 
of countries on a common scale and purse important research questions. For instance, the index 
turns out to be negatively correlated with the Gini index, which suggests that in countries where 
elites are less powerful or more committed to value creation business models, citizens will be more 
equal. 
In this vein, EQx can serve as a tool to communicate insights and can be used as basis for 
discussions with policymakers, decision-makers running elite business models and, hopefully, 
with the general public. 
All the underlying assumptions and methods used for index construction have been 
presented in detail, to render the index as transparent, justifiable and reliable as possible. The 
different index levels allow for both an overall quantification of a country’s elite quality, as well 
as an in-depth analysis regarding specific aspects of elite quality at four different levels of analysis 
(index, sub-index and index area, pillar and finally at the indicator level). The methodology can 
be applied to improved datasets covering a larger number of countries and additional indicators. 
The variety of robustness tests run suggest that EQx scores and ranking are not driven by individual 
indicators, different levels of data availability or the chosen normalization method, and are largely 
robust to a range of alternative weighting and aggregation schemes. 
 44 
 
Secondly, the proposed methodology is applied using data on 32 countries and 72 
indicators. Thus, the EQx is the first internationally comparable index that quantifies and 
operationalizes elite quality. The index offers unique insights, possibly controversial but certainly 
interesting, and enriches the options to analyze the political economy of countries and future 
economic and human growth prospects. The EQx reveals substantial differences in the state of 
elite quality across the considered countries. We demonstrate the usefulness of the EQx by 
presenting three country portraits, on the U.S., Germany, and Portugal, levering the novel 
analytical toolbox. 
This paper has focused on presenting the index construction process and scrutinizing the 
robustness of EQx scores and ranking - ceteris paribus - to changes in key modelling choices. We 
have refrained from an econometric analysis using the index and its constellation of sub-indices 
and pillars, because this will be the focus of future research. 
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Appendix 
A1 EQx indicator list 
Table A1. EQx indicator list 
 
Index Area 
Description Coin 
side 
Country 
coverage 
Data 
type 
Within 
pillar 
weight 
(BAP) 
Within 
EQx 
weight 
Source 
 Pillar 
  Indicator 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
i Political Power 
 
  
    
  i.1 State Capture 
 
  
    
  
COR Political corruption Political corruption subset of the Varieties of 
Democracies Database (V-DEM) 
E 31 Index 19.5% 0.8% Varieties of Democracies (V-DEM) 
  
MOB Social Mobility Intergenerational mobility database (GDIM) C 29 Raw 15.6% 0.7% The World Bank, GDIM Database 
  
PDE Political decentralization Political decentralization subset of the World Bank 
decentralization indicators 
C 32 Index 14.1% 0.6% The World Bank, Policy Research 
Working Paper 
  
ADE Administrative 
decentralization 
Administrative decentralization subset of the World 
Bank decentralization indicators 
C 32 Index 10.9% 0.5% The World Bank, Policy Research 
Working Paper 
  
PGL Political globalisation Political dimension of the KOF Globalization index C 32 Index 12.7% 0.5% ETHZ, The KOF Globalisation Index 
  
WPI Women Power Index  Women Power Index  C 32 Index 14.1% 0.6% The Council of Foreign Relations 
(CFR) 
  
GRC Government's 
responsiveness to change  
Indicator of the WEF Global Competitiveness Index  C 32 Index 13.1% 0.5% World Economic Forum, The Global 
Competitiveness Index 
  i.2 Regulatory Capture        
  
DBI Institutional quality World Bank Ease of Doing Business Index C 32 Index 32.9% 1.4% The World Bank, Doing Business 
Index 
  
CRO Crony-capitalism Percent of wealth accumulated by billionaires from 
activities in industries classified as “Crony” by the 
Economist, i.e. “susceptible to monopoly or 
requir[ing] licensing or highly depend on the 
government” (The Economist, Website) 
 
E 30 Raw 29.2% 1.3% Forbes [Billionaires list] & The World 
Bank [GDP] 
  
EXP Expropriation risk "The risk of expropriation encompasses all 
discriminatory measures taken by a host 
government which deprive the investor of its 
investment without any adequate compensation” 
(The Global Economy, Website) 
E 32 Index 19.2% 0.8% Credendo 
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PMI Protecting Minority 
Investors  
Indicator of the World Bank Ease of Doing 
Business Index  
C 32 Index 11.9% 0.5% The World Bank, Doing Business 
Indicators 
  
ECR Ease to Challenge 
Regulations 
Indicator of the WEF Global Competitiveness Index  E 32 Index 6.8% 0.3% World Economic Forum, The Global 
Competitiveness Index 
 
i.3 Human Capture   
  
    
  
UNI Unionization rate Total membership of (independent) trade unions in 
a nation as percentage of all employees 
E 24 Raw 20.2% 0.6% International Labor Organisation, 
ILOSTAT Database 
  
PSE Public sector employees 
as % of total employment 
Public sector employment in general government 
sector plus employment of public corporations, 
minus employees in public health and education, as 
percentage of total employment 
C 32 Raw 18.0% 0.6% International Labor Organisation, 
ILOSTAT Database 
  
CBC Collective Bargaining 
Coverage 
“Number of employees whose pay and/or 
conditions of employment are determined by one or 
more collective agreement(s) as percentage of the 
total number of employees” (ILOSTAT, Website) 
E 20 Index 16.2% 0.5% International Labor Organisation, 
ILOSTAT Database 
  
GSI Global Slavery Index Global Slavery Index  E 32 Index 25.1% 0.8% The Minderoo Foundation Pty Ltd 
and the Walk Free Foundation 
  
WBL Women, Business and the 
Law 
Women, Business and the Law index  C 32 Index 20.4% 0.6% The World Bank 
           
ii Economic Power        
  ii.4 Industry Dominance        
  
IEE Top 3 industries exports 
as % of exports 
Sum of the exports of a nation's 3 top exporting 
industries as percentage of GDP 
E 31 Raw 22.4% 1.1% United Nations, Comtrade Database 
[exports] & The World Bank [GDP] 
  
IRE Top 3 industries as % of 
GDP 
Sum of the revenues of a nation's 3 biggest 
industries as percentage of GDP 
E 24 Raw 25.3% 1.2% UNdata, Accounts Official Country 
Data  
  
ECI Economic Complexity 
Index  
Economic Complexity Index  C 28 Index 38.4% 1.8% The Observatory of Economic 
Complexity (OEC) 
  
IVA Top 3 industries as % of 
VA 
Sum of the value-add induced by a nation's 3 top 
industries as percentage of total value-add 
C 32 Raw 13.9% 0.7% UNdata, National Accounts Estimates 
of Main Aggregates  
  ii.5 Firm Dominance         
  
PRO Top 10 firms profitability Average profitability of a country's top 10 
companies in terms of profits 
E 32 Raw 13.4% 0.7% ThomsonOne 
  
SME SME per 1,000 people Subset of the MSME Database  C 30 Raw 15.0% 0.8% SME Finance Forum, MSME 
Economic Indicators  
  
ATX Antitrust exemptions Subset of the OECD Product Market Regulations 
(PMR) Database  
E 12 Index 18.0% 0.9% OECD, Product Economic Regulation 
Statistics  
  
BIW Billionaires' wealth as % 
of GDP 
Sum of a nation's billionaires' total accumulated 
wealth as percentage of GDP 
E 29 Raw 15.6% 0.8% Forbes [Billionaires list] & The World 
Bank [GDP] 
  
FKG Top 10 firms market cap 
as % of GDP  
Sum of the market capitalizations of a country's 10 
largest companies - defined by market capitalization 
- as percentage of GDP 
E 32 Raw 13.5% 0.7% ThomsonOne 
  
FRG Top 3 firms revenues as % 
of GDP 
Sum of the revenues of a country's 3 largest firms - 
defined by revenues - as percentage of GDP 
E 32 Raw 5.9% 0.3% ThomsonOne 
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FRR Top 30 firms revenues as 
% of GDP 
Sum of the revenues of a country's 30 largest firms 
- defined by revenues - as percentage of GDP 
E 31 Raw 9.7% 0.5% ThomsonOne 
  
LIB Lerner Index banking 
sector 
Difference between output prices and marginal 
costs. “Prices are calculated as total bank revenue 
over assets, whereas marginal costs are obtained 
from an estimated translog cost function with 
respect to output" (World Bank, Website) 
E 28 Raw 8.9% 0.5% The World Bank 
  ii.6 Creative Destruction         
  
TUL Listed firms turnover, 
long run 15 years  
Long-run turnover rate of firms in a country’s 
leading stock exchange index. The average turnover 
of the last 15 years is calculated 
C 21 Raw 7.5% 0.9% Thomson Reuters Eikon 
  
TUS Listed firms turnover, 
short run 3 years  
Short-run turnover rate of firms in a country’s 
leading stock exchange index. The average turnover 
of the last 3 years is calculated 
C 21 Raw 9.3% 1.2% Thomson Reuters Eikon 
  
ENT Entrepreneurship Global Entrepreneurship and Development Index C 32 Index 21.4% 2.7% The Global Entrepreneurship and 
Development Institute (GEDI) 
  
VCK VC finance Venture capital (VC) investment in high-growth 
venture companies divided by the total investment 
in an economy 
C 32 Raw 21.4% 2.7% Main: OECD.Stat & various others 
  
RND R&D % GDP Investments in research and development (R&D) as 
percentage of GDP 
C 28 Raw 10.6% 1.3% UNESCO Institute for Statistics 
  
BTS Barriers to start-ups Average (equal weighting) of 2 subsets (BTE & 
ABS) of the OECD Product Market Regulations 
(PMR) Database 
E 24 Index 15.1% 1.9% OECD, Product Economic Regulation 
Statistics  
  
ENR Firm entry ratio Number of new companies per 1,000 working-age 
people (15-64) 
C 29 Raw 10.5% 1.3% The World Bank, Doing Business 
Indicators 
  
EXR Firm exit ratio Death rate of companies, i.e. the "number of 
enterprise deaths in the reference period (t) divided 
by the number of enterprises active in t" (OECD, 
Website). 
C 9 Raw 4.3% 0.5% OECD 
        
iii Political Value    
    
  iii.7 Giving Income    
    
  
SNT Subsidies and transfers as 
% of expenses 
Subsidies and transfers as percentage of payments 
for operating activities of the government 
E 28 Raw 22.3% 1.8% International Monetary Fund, 
Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook (retrieved from the World 
Bank) 
  
REG Regional redistribution as 
% of government budget 
Government wealth transfers between a country's 
geographical areas as percentage of government 
budget 
E 31 Raw 19.4% 1.6% Fraser Institute 
  
EDU School life expectancy “Total number of years of schooling (primary 
through tertiary) that a child of school entrance age 
can expect to receive” (UNESCO, Website) 
C 27 Raw 20.4% 1.7% UNESCO Institute for Statistics 
(UIS.Stats) 
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GPS Expenditure on general 
public services as % of 
GDP (dev. fm optimum) 
Subset of the Classification of the Functions of 
Government (COFOG) Database.  
C 21 Raw 13.7% 1.1% International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
Government Finance Statistics (GFS) 
  
GHS Global Health Security  Global Health Security Index  C 32 Index 8.6% 0.7% GHS Index by the NTI, JHU and EIU 
  
COV Covid-19 safety COVID-19 Safety Index C 20 Index 15.7% 1.3% Deep Knowledge Group 
  iii.8 Taking Income         
  
DCT Corporate tax rate (dev. 
fm optimum) 
Highest statutory corporate tax rate at central 
government level  
C 32 Raw 12.7% 1.0% KPMG 
  
DKI Delta capital gains tax vs 
income tax  
Delta between the individual capital gains tax rate 
and the individual income tax rate.  
C 28 Raw 15.7% 1.3%  PWC [Capital Gain Tax] & KPMG 
[Personal Income Tax] 
  
HOM Homicide rate Number of homicides per 100,000 people per year E 28 Raw 22.9% 1.9% United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) 
  
INE Top 10% share of pre-tax 
national income 
Share of pre-tax national income accruing to the 90-
100 percentile of adult individuals (over 20 years 
old)  
E 21 Raw 10.2% 0.8% World Inequality Lab, World 
Inequality Database (WID) 
  
FDE Fiscal descentralization Average of the 36 Indicators of the IMF's Fiscal 
Decentralization dataset 
C 22 Index 13.5% 1.1% International Monetary Fund (IMF)  
  
DTR Tax revenue as % of GDP 
(dev. fm optimum) 
Tax revenue as percentage of GDP C 29 Raw 13.3% 1.1% International Monetary Fund, 
Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook & World Bank and OECD 
GDP estimates (retrieved from the 
World Bank) 
  
BRD Battle-related deaths per 
100,000 people 
Deaths in battle-related conflicts per 100,000 
people 
E 32 Raw 11.8% 1.0% Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
(retrieved from the World Bank) 
  iii.9 Unearned Income        
  
DUT Dutch disease propensity Rents derived from natural resources as percentage 
of GDP 
E 32 Raw 22.1% 1.4% The World Bank 
  
SOE State ownership, control 
and involvement in 
business 
Average (equal weighting) of 6 subsets (STC, 
POW, IBO, SCP, DCB, GIN) of the OECD Product 
Market Regulations (PMR) Database 
E 24 Index 17.6% 1.1% OECD, Product Market Regulations 
Statistics 
  
EPI Environmental 
Performance Index  
Environmental Performance Index C 32 Index 34.2% 2.1% Yale Center for Environmental Law 
& Policy  
  
DBT Government Debt as % of 
GDP 
Government Debt as % of GDP  E 32 Raw 26.1% 1.6% The Global Economy 
            
iv Economic Value    
  
   
  iv.10 Producer Rent    
    
  
TRF Trade freedom Index of Economic Freedom  C 32 Index 20.0% 2.5% The Heritage Foundation, Index of 
Economic Freedom  
  
BTE Barriers to entry Average (equal weighting) of 6 subsets (LPS, CSR, 
ABC, ABP, LBR, BEN) of the OECD Product 
Market Regulations (PMR) Database 
E 24 Index 21.2% 2.7% OECD, Product Market Regulations 
Statistics 
  
FDI FDI net Inflows as % of 
GDP 
“Net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting 
management interest (10 percent or more of voting 
C 32 Raw 16.8% 2.1% International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics and 
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stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy 
other than that of the investor” (World Bank, 
Website), as a percentage of GDP 
Balance of Payments databases and 
various others (retrieved from the 
World Bank) 
  
BTF Barriers to FDI FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index (FDI Index)  E 28 Index 10.9% 1.4% OECD, FDI Regulatory 
Restrictiveness Index 
  
EGL Economic globalisation Economic dimension of the KOF Globalization 
Index 
C 32 Index 12.0% 1.5% ETHZ, The KOF Globalization Index 
  
DHC Health Care as % of GDP 
(dev. fm optimum) 
Current Health Expenditure as percentage of GDP 
subset of the WHO Global Health Expenditure 
Database 
C 31 Raw 13.0% 1.7% World Health Organization, Global 
Health Expenditure Database 
  
OFB Open for Business Open for Business subset of the U.S. News Best 
Countries 2020 Ranking  
C 27 Index 6.0% 0.8% U.S.News & World Report LP, Best 
Countries 2020  
  iv.11 Capital Rent         
  
DNI Neutral interest rate (dev. 
fm optimum) 
The neutral interest rate is derived from the 
following formula: k% + (M1 growth/ GDP 
growth), with "k%" corresponding to Friedmann's 
"k" set at 2% and “M1” corresponding to the money 
supply from central banks 
C 24 Raw 31.3% 4.6% OECD [M1] & World Bank national 
accounts data [GDP growth] 
  
DOI Inflation (dev. fm 
optimum) 
Annual percentage change in the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) 
C 32 Index 22.8% 3.4% World Economic Forum, The Global 
Competitiveness Index 
  
CUA Currency appreciation Real effective exchange rate (REER)  C 32 Raw 18.4% 2.7% Bruegel 
  
GOL Gold demand as % of 
GDP 
Gold demand encompasses the demand (in tons) for 
gold bars and coins and for jewelry, as a percentage 
of GDP 
E 21 Raw 9.5% 1.4% World Official Gold supply and 
demand Statistic  
  
DMA M&A as % of Investment 
(dev. fm optimum) 
Sum of all M&A deals with a value greater than 
USD 100m, as percentage of total investment 
C 30 Raw 18.0% 2.7% Thomson Reuters Eikon [M&A] & 
OECD [Investment] 
  iv.12 Labor Rent        
  
UEM Unemployment rate “Share of the labor force that is without work but 
available for and seeking employment” (WB, 
Website) 
E 31 Raw 23.7% 3.8% International Labour Organization 
(ILOSTAT database) (retrieved from 
the World Bank) 
  
LFP Labor force participation 
rate 
Economically active portion of the population 
(labor force) divided by the portion of the 
population aged between 15 and 64 (working-age 
population) 
C 19 Raw 8.7% 1.4% OECD 
  
WLP Delta real wage vs labor 
productivity increases 
Delta between real wage increase, measured 
through labor compensation per hour worked, and 
labor productivity increase, measured through GDP 
per hour worked  
C 15 Raw 19.6% 3.2% OECD 
  
LDR Labor dependency ratio Dependents i.e. portion of the population aged 0 to 
14 and people aged 15 and above that are either 
outside the labor force or unemployed, as 
percentage of total employment.  
E 32 Raw 10.1% 1.6% International Labor Organisation 
(ILOSTAT Database) 
  
YUN Youth unemployment rate “Share of the labor force ages 15-24 without work 
but available for and seeking employment” (KOF, 
Website) 
E 32 Raw 20.5% 3.3% The World Bank (retrieved from The 
Global Economy) 
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GWG Gender wage gap “Difference between male and female median 
wages divided by the male median wages” (OECD, 
Website) 
E 18 Raw 17.3% 2.8% OECD 
Note: List of all indicators considered for the EQx. The first column indicates whether an indicator measures value creation (C) or extraction (E), column (2) provides a short description, 
column (3) indicates how many countries are covered, column (4) lists the type of the underlying dataset. Column (5) and (6) indicate the indicator’s within pillar weight as determined 
via the Budget Allocation Process (rounded to 1 decimal) as well as the final within EQx weight (rounded to 2 decimals). Weights may not add up to 100 due to rounding. Finally, 
column (7) gives the source. 
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A2 Country scorecards 
Figure A1. EQx country scorecard of the United States 
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Figure A2. EQx country scorecard of Germany 
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Figure A3. EQx country scorecard of Portugal 
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